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Economists in the PITS? 
 
Abstract: Academic economists today are caught in a “Publication 
Impossibility Theorem System” or PITS. To further their careers, they 
are required to publish in A-journals, but for the vast majority this is 
impossible because there are few slots open in such journals. Such 
academic competition maybe useful to generate hard work, however, 
there may be serious negative consequences: the wrong output may be 
produced in an inefficient way, the wrong people may be selected, 
and losers may react in a harmful way. This paper suggests several 
ways to remedy this situation.   
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An Impossibility 
Many economists feel that they work in the PITS. They are 
subjected to a publication system, which demands extremely hard 
work, but offers only a minute chance of success. Today this 
applies in particular to young scholars who, in many countries, 
know that they can only obtain a permanent position at a good 
university if they publish in an “A-journal”2. A conventional list of 
A-journals3 includes The American Economic Review, 
Econometrica, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, and The Review of Economic Studies. Only when a 
young scholar has had at least one article, preferably two or three, 
published in these journals, can he or she hope to procure tenure or 
promotion to a full professorship. A full professor is expected to 
have papers accepted regularly in these A-journals; otherwise, is 
considered not up to the task. These “publish in A-journals or 
perish” requirements are rarely explicit or written down4. That they 
                                                
2  The same holds for business schools in the United States exhibiting an “extreme 
emphasis” on publications in A-journals (Starbuck 2005). For further evidence see Moizer 
(2009).  
3  See e.g. Lee 2006 for various definitions and the corresponding literature. 
4  Faculties of economics at numerous universities (e.g. the University of Linz in 
Austria), as well as economics associations (e.g. the Verein fuer Socialpolitik, the association 
of economists in Germany, Austria and Switzerland), have an official list in which they assign 
points for publishing in A-, B-, C- etc. journals. Typically, a publication in one of the A-
journals listed above gives three times as many points as a B-journal publication. There are 
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do, in fact, exist is based on the author's recent conversations with 
both junior and senior scholars in Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom5. 
This paper argues that it is simply impossible to meet this 
requirement because the number of scholars trying to achieve 
publication in A-journals is far larger than the number of slots open 
for publication. To borrow from a famous theory, one can loosely 
speak of an “Impossibility Theorem” with respect to publishing 
requirements: For the population of aspiring academic economists, 
it is in general impossible to meet publishing requirements. 
                                                                                                                                                  
also universities that explicitly offer a monetary reward for publishing in highly ranked 
journals. The University of Economics and Business Administration in Vienna, for example, 
pays authors 3,000 Euros for publication in what they define as an AT-journal (which, in 
economics, includes the five journals in the text above, as well as six more), and 1,000 Euros 
for publication in an A-journal, i.e. a top publication is defined to be worth three times as 
much as a second-rate one (http://wu-wien.ac.at/forschung.praemie). The Tinbergen 
Institute in the Netherlands distinguishes between journals ranked “AA”, “A” and “B”. 
Among the latter are (otherwise highly regarded) reviews such as !"#$#%&"'()*#+,$'-)#.)
!"#$#%&")/01'2&#,)'$3)4,5'$&6'7&#$()or !"#$#%&")80770,9:) Other universities do not 
consider journal publications lower than A at all. It is sometimes rumored that to publish in 
B, C, or other lower ranked journals has even a negative effect on one’s career.  
5  As always, it is difficult to state whether, and to what extent, this and the following 
arguments apply to the United States academic system because it is characterized by such a 
wide variety: The top universities are very different from minor institutions which also call 
themselves universities. 
 Another question is to what extent the observations and suggestions discussed here 
also apply to disciplines outside economics. While they can certainly not be directly 
transferred, there are indications that many aspects are also relevant elsewhere, see e.g. 
the discussion by Hewstone and Stroebe (2008) on social psychology.  
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Scholars can thus be taken to work in the PITS, i.e. in a 
“Publication Impossibility Theorem System”.  
 
 
Table 1 shows the number of slots, or the supply, available in A-
journals per year. 
 
Table 1. Slots in A-journals, 2007   
Journal 
Total 
number of 
articles 
Articles by 
scholars in 
top US 
universities 
Articles by 
economists 
in the US 
American Economic Review a) 102 44 (43%) 84 (82%) 
Econometrica 51 18 (35%) 38 (75%) 
Journal of Political Economy 31 19 (61%) 25 (81%) 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 44 25 (57%) 37 (84%) 
Review of Economic Studies 47 13 (28%) 40 (85%) 
  275 119 (43%) 224 (81%) 
a) Papers and Proceedings are excluded.     
 
 
 
Table 1 shows that in 2007 overall 275 articles were published in A-
journals. More than 40% of those contributions were provided by 
scholars from the top US universities (Harvard, MIT, Princeton, Yale, 
Berkeley, and Stanford); more than 80% of all articles by scholars 
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working in the United States. If this distribution holds in the future 
(and there is little reason to expect any drastic changes), an academic 
from any other country (of the more than 190) in the world can expect 
to be in the competition for the roughly 50 remaining slots.  
It is extremely difficult to estimate how large the demand to publish 
in top economics journals is in any given year. A rough estimate is 
that there are around 10,000 academics actively aspiring to publish in 
A-journals. The true figure is probably even larger, as one single 
outlet, RePec, lists no less than 20,000 scholars presently creating 
academic writing. Even if two-thirds of them are from the United 
States, there are around 7,000 scholars from all other countries. 
However, it may safely be assumed that a considerable number are 
not listed in RePec, precisely because they have not yet been 
successful in publishing in one of the journals or other publication 
outlets included in RePec. What matters is that, by necessity, an 
extremely low share of aspiring scholars will be able to publish in an 
A-journal. Publication in these journals is characterized by extreme 
excess demand.  
 
This is Just a Tournament 
The requirement to publish in A-journals can be understood as a 
tournament in which only one person or, in our case, a few people rise 
to the top, while the great majority of contenders fail to do so (Frank 
2001, 2004). Such a tournament (Lazear and Rosen 1981) is held to 
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provide the incentives necessary to put in lots of effort and do better 
than the other contenders. These are the beneficial effects of “publish 
or perish” which conventional economics has in mind. 
 
 
But There May Be Problems… 
The tournament system reflected in the PITS possibly does not 
produce the claimed positive overall effects, if the following four 
problems arise: 
1. If the selection of papers is random or distorted. 
The papers accepted in the A-journals must conform exactly to a 
clearly specified criterion. This criterion is defined within 
academia, or by the “republic of science” (see Polanyi 1967, 
Merton 1973, Osterloh and Frey 2009a, 2009b), in our case by 
the peer group of academic economists. Sociologists refer to 
such a criterion as “self-referential”, as it is independent of any 
outside evaluation. A self-defined criterion could easily be 
criticized by arguing that any discipline should consider the 
interests of the wider public. This is particularly true of 
economics. Many people take it for granted that academic 
economists should help other people in society, in particular 
political and administrative decision-makers, to better 
understand how the economy works and to improve its 
performance (see e.g. Colander et al. 2009 addressing the 
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systematic failure of academic economists to adequately deal 
with the current financial crisis). While it is difficult to define 
exactly what this means, it is clear that such an objective is 
determined from outside the discipline. 
Even if the internal criterion by the academic economics 
profession were consistent with the external criterion described 
above – which can well be doubted6 – it remains open to debate 
whether the members of the discipline are able to select the 
respective papers. The selection of papers relies on an elaborate 
system of peer reviews, which is considered the only reliable ex 
ante evaluation method. However, there exists substantial 
empirical evidence that in general the peer-review process does 
not perform very well, and in particular that the selection of 
papers for A-journals resembles a random process (see, 
extensively, Daniel 1993, Frey 2003, Bedeian 2004, Weingart 
2005, Tsang and Frey 2007, Osterloh and Frey 2009b, Gillies 
2008, Raelin 2008). The inter-rater reliability is deficient (see 
e.g. Starbuck 2006); the evaluation of a paper by various 
referees, on average, correlates only by 0.2 to 0.3, which is also 
rather low. Moreover, Oswald (2007) recently demonstrated that 
many papers published in B-journals get far more subsequent 
citations than many papers published in A-journals. As citations 
                                                
6  See the charges of  “autism” made against standard economics from many quarters. 
The movement, which started in the Grandes Ecoles in France and led to an on-line journal, 
;#97<=+7&97&")!"#$#%&"9)>02&0?, is well known. 
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are considered the ultimate ex post evaluation in the profession, 
this evidence suggests that the present refereeing process is open 
to criticism. 
 
2. If the publishing activity is wasteful 
Even if the selection of articles for A-journals were perfect 
(which it never is nor ever will be), there remains the question 
whether the social benefits produced by such a publication is 
worth the input of labor required. This is not necessarily the 
case, as the hours needed to write a paper acceptable for an A-
journal can be immense; some scholars work for a year or more 
to try to get a single paper into one of these few journals. 
Scholars are well aware that a considerable part of this huge 
effort is devoted to technique and presentation, rather than to 
content. A large part of the effort is devoted to write the paper 
such that it will meet the actual or imagined requirements of the 
referees and editors7.  Referring to the high rejection rates, 
Moizer (2009:1) utters a widespread feeling: “Something cannot 
be right with a system which creates so much apparent waste”. 
A large share of the papers written with huge effort and time 
input are totally disregarded. The median number of citations of 
economics papers is zero, or close to zero. According to Laband 
                                                
7 “a academics may spend as much time on the style of their writing and the orientation of 
their arguments as on the raw content” (Raelin 2008: 125, see also Black, Brown, Day and 
Rice 1998, Frey 2003). 
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and Tollison (2003), in a sample of 73 journals in 1974 and 91 
journals in 1996, 26% of papers were never cited. One has to go 
through 70% of the papers before the average per paper has 
been cited more than once. This can hardly be considered to be 
highly productive, as the “dry holes” dominate by far.  
It may nevertheless be claimed that even if a large majority of 
papers does not make it into an A-journal, and even if a large 
majority of publications in A-journals (and elsewhere) were 
indeed of little or no value (as they are never cited by peers), 
this production is necessary in order for a few gems to be 
produced. It is indeed impossible to predict which scientific 
contributions peers will consider to be important in the future 
(see, extensively, Frey and Osterloh 2009b). The gems only 
reveal themselves after some time, often a lengthy period. But 
this does not mean that the existing publication process should 
be taken to be sacrosanct. Different institutional arrangements 
than the existing tournament may be better able to produce the 
gems, and create less waste. The fact that (especially young) 
scholars are forced to pursue publishing in A-journals should 
not be taken to mean that this rule is efficient. It is certainly 
difficult to undertake even a basic comparison between the 
social benefits produced by the existing publication activity in 
A-journals and the huge costs in terms of energy used 
specifically in trying to get papers published in these journals 
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(see Gans and Shepard 1994). It may be argued that at least the 
part of the rent-seeking activity devoted to pleasing the referees 
and the editors, and to fulfill purely formal requirements (such 
as the way the citations have to be arranged, and the paper has to 
be submitted) are wasteful. 
 The crucial question is whether a more efficient system is 
attainable. One should actively consider alternatives to the 
present arrangement. It should be legitimate to at least ask 
whether the overall productivity of economists, from the point 
of view of society, would not be higher if they could choose 
more freely what and where they wanted to publish (for 
instance, in the form of books, contributions to collected 
volumes, and even in the general media), and even whether 
publishing is the main, or only, activity in which they should be 
obliged to engage. It cannot be dismissed readily that 
economists might perform a more useful social service if a 
larger number of them were induced to solve pressing and 
applied current problems rather than to be “wasted” in the 
useless effort of publishing papers in A-journals.  
A more efficient policy than “publish in A-journals or perish” 
could possibly be to induce scholars to first establish their 
credentials in economics by writing a number of papers devoted 
to the solution of concrete issues that, due to their lesser formal 
elegance, are inappropriate for A-journals. 
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3. If the “wrong” people are selected 
A tournament among papers submitted to A-journals only leads 
to a satisfactory selection of people in academia if writing top 
papers is the only relevant criterion. This is doubtful as 
academics have to fulfill various other important activities, i.e. 
they should be engaged in multiple other tasks. The most 
important among these are: 
- Teaching; 
- Supporting young scholars (PhDs and postdoctoral students); 
- Informing and advising the public; and, 
- Participating in university administration. 
To excel in these tasks can, but does not necessarily has to, 
positively correlate with the ability to write A-journal papers. 
Due to the fact that only the peers can evaluate the value of 
research, there is a permanent danger of a increasing gap 
between research and practice. Few scholars in economics seem 
to be ready to seriously consider this dilemma. They prefer to 
take it for granted that the research published in A-journals is 
always useful to practice even though there does not seem to be 
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any empirical evidence to support that view (but neither to the 
contrary, see Frey 20068). 
As the pursuit to publish in top journals is extremely arduous 
and time-consuming, it is likely that a negative correlation 
between publishing and the four tasks just mentioned is 
generally produced. Due to the time-and-effort constraints, few 
scholars are able to perform these tasks sufficiently well and 
also fully engage in the publishing tournament. The publishing 
record being easy to measure, while the performance with 
respect to the four other tasks is not, the multiple-task effect 
(Holmström and Milgrom 1991, Prendergast 1999) suggests that 
academics mainly engage in publishing efforts and disregard the 
other tasks.  
Imposing strict requirements for publishing in A-journals also 
tends to lead to an undesirable selection effect among 
participants, as intrinsically motivated scholars, especially those 
interested in teaching and informing the public, are likely to be 
put off while extrinsically motivated scholars thrive (this is the 
crowding-out effect, see Frey 1997, Bénabou and Tirole 2003). 
The fact that there are always some extremely gifted and 
extrinsically motivated scholars who excel in several of these 
                                                
8 In a related field, accounting, some authors are prepared to conclude that accounting 
research has little or no effect on practice, see Bedford (1978:2), Dyckman, Gibbier and 
Swiering (1978:87), Kaplan (1978:168), Sullivan (1993), and Moizer (2009:3).  
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tasks simultaneously is not a sufficient argument to force all of 
them to participate in the publication tournament. There are not 
only above average but also below average scholars for whom 
the requirement to publish in A-journals takes away a very large 
amount of time and effort from other tasks. Moreover, it is 
difficult to imagine a well-functioning department composed of 
A-journal publishing scholars only. A balanced mixture of 
various capabilities is more likely to work successfully; in 
particular, it allows the most gifted scholars to have the room to 
flourish.  
 
4. If the reaction of the losers is harmful.  
The cost of the PITS depends to a great extent on how scholars 
unable to publish in A-journals react and what their options are. 
Some people who in the past lost in the tournament keep trying 
to publish in A-journals but it is unrealistic to assume that they 
will do so over an extended period. Most of them are realistic 
enough to realize sooner or later that they will not be successful. 
They may resort to several different kinds of behavior: 
(a) They can try to publish in lower ranked journals knowing 
that based on that, they will not attain a satisfactory position at a 
good university. The question is whether such lesser careers 
exist in a particular university system. If the strict “publish in A-
journals or perish” requirement is in force, such lesser careers do 
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not exist and these people will have to leave and work outside 
academia.  
(b) The “losers” can decide to give up their plan to stay in the 
university system and exit the profession. This selection effect is 
socially beneficial if the publication tournament is fully 
efficient. Otherwise, the strict requirement to publish in A-
journals leads to an unwanted adverse selection of scholars able 
to write the necessary A-papers, but who turn out to be of little 
use or even outright failures with respect to other university 
tasks. The distribution of talent between scholars who are able to 
publish in A-journals and those who are not is likely to overlap. 
It follows that the worst scholars with top publications are less 
able (they are “lemons”) than the best scholars without a-level 
publications. An exit to activities outside the university may be 
socially beneficial if the effort to publish in A-journals helps 
them to be better trained in other occupations. This may, but 
need not, be the case9 because the writing of papers for A-
journals is a quite specialized activity: a necessary requirement 
is to follow the self-defined criteria the economics profession 
happens to have during a particular period, but which outsiders 
                                                
9  It can be argued that an economist who manages to publish one or two papers in an 
A-journal is often worse than somebody who engages in broader academic activities, and 
has published papers in respectable, but not top, journals. The former has devoted all effort 
to writing papers acceptable to the referees of the top journals, but otherwise is not well 
trained for the other academic tasks. (I owe this point to Reiner Eichenberger) 
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might not necessarily find important. Today, this refers to the 
specific way Americans write scientific works10, to the 
language, and especially to the techniques of analysis used. An 
example is the current extreme focus on the “identification” 
problem in econometric analysis, i.e. the need to clearly 
establish often opposing causal relationships. In many cases, 
discussions in academic seminars, and the decision to reject a 
paper in a journal, is reduced to this issue, essentially neglecting 
all other, possibly important, aspects. It sometimes seems that 
the content of a contribution has become more or less irrelevant, 
and the only thing that really counts is technical dexterity (see 
Ellison 2002, Frey, Eichenberger and Frey 2009). An economist 
sharing this view with the public and wanting to concentrate on 
issues of content rather than on technique, finds it nearly 
impossible to publish in an A-journal. He or she will then be lost 
for the profession.  
(c)  The “losers” stay on as long as they can in their university 
job (which in some European countries means for very many 
years, if not for life). They may well be psychologically 
depressed, even show signs of mental disorder. Others may 
become aggressive and obstruct the work of those scholars who 
                                                
10  French or German scholars traditionally developed their ideas in a way, which 
differs fundamentally from the way Americans do today. But it should not be forgotten that 
this kind of writing was used by some of the most original and best scholars in the discipline. 
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hope to meet the publication requirements (see Lazear 1995 on 
sabotage). A milder form of such behavior is taking a long time, 
and disregarding the time limits set by the editors, when asked 
to referee (thus extending the already long time period before 
journals take even a first decision), writing dismissive, hostile or 
even devastating referee reports for professional journals (Miller 
2006). Circumstantial evidence suggests that such negative 
attitudes have become more common than they used to be in the 
past, reflecting the increasingly strict publication pressure. 
Depending on what type of reaction prevails, the A-journal 
publication tournament may lead to positive or negative consequences 
overall. The present system of forcing scholars to try to publish in top 
journals only, and disqualifying all other publication outlets, may 
have negative consequences in various respects.   
 
An Open Issue 
If the analysis above is correct, it is debatable whether the PITS is 
socially beneficial or not. At the least, it should not be taken for 
granted (as is generally done today) that the PITS is a good, or even 
the best, way to organize academia. Before such a conclusion is 
drawn, a serious discussion of the possible negative effects is in order, 
and much more empirical evidence is needed. The evaluation should 
not be confined to considering the effects on (internally defined) 
“scientific excellence”, but should also consider the possible negative 
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aspects: imperfect and biased selection of papers and of scholars, 
effects on other economic activities and on those scholars not 
successful in the tournament. Moreover, the present system of the A-
journal publication requirement should be compared to alternative 
ways of organizing science:  
(d) One possibility would be to solve the multiple-tasking 
problem by making an effort to measure all aspects important 
for an academic career: teaching, supporting younger scholars, 
linking up to the public, and participating in academic 
administration. While this first option seems straightforward, it 
is not to be recommended. It would lead to an enormous amount 
of evaluation, and scholars would invariably find ways to “beat 
the system”. 
(e) A quite different, and even contrary, option is to resort to 
an overall evaluation of young scholars based on the intuitive 
knowledge of seasoned scholars. There are various possibilities 
to select such persons. An attractive option would be to elect 
them by a vote among the members of the respective 
professional organization. This would ensure that the peers 
making up the “Republic of Science” are in control. The 
scholars elected by such a procedure would be under the 
scrutiny of the profession as a whole and would lose their 
reputation among their peers if they pushed unfounded personal 
interests. This gives them an incentive to decide as objectively 
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as possible while maintaining an overall perspective. This 
option gives the members of professional organizations more 
power compared to today and helps to fight the oligopolistic 
tendencies of the small number of A-journals.  
Nevertheless, such a procedure seems to be “unscientific” 
because it is not based on the seemingly neutral measures of 
publications in A-journals. However, such a view is too simple. 
According to recent psychological research, “gut feelings” are 
often superior to in-depth analyses (Gigerenzer 2007, 2002, 
popularized by Gladwell 2005). Indeed, many established 
scholars proceed in this way when they exchange their views 
about younger scholars. What matters to them is indeed the gut 
feeling, and not whether someone has published a paper in a 
particular A-journal.  
Using the intuitive knowledge of seasoned scholars has, of 
course, disadvantages. There is certainly the danger of an “old 
boys network” giving young scholars an incentive to attempt to 
personally please the seasoned scholars. Personality and 
friendship may matter more than research excellence because 
gut feelings are to some extent influenced by such perceptions. 
On the other hand, these claimed disadvantages should not be 
overrated. It should not be forgotten that the present system 
focusing on A-journal publications is also influenced by 
personal relationships and preferences, as well as by selfish 
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interests. It has, for instance, become a common practice in 
economics to abundantly and positively cite possible referees in 
order to raise the chance of acceptance.  In contrast, aspiring 
scholars refrain from criticizing other scholars fearing that they 
will be chosen as referees and will react negatively11. Even more 
importantly, scholars in dire need of publication are induced to 
follow the referees’ “advice” even if they clash with their own 
insights and views. This behavior has been called “academic 
prostitution” (Frey 2003).  
(f)  A third possibility is to restrict the PITS to the early phase 
of a scientific career. Scholars must learn the tools of the trade 
and must show that they are able to use them with profit. 
Thereafter, one should let scholars proceed as they see fit for 
themselves (see more fully Osterloh and Frey 2009b)12. This 
allows them to exhibit their intrinsic motivation in scientific 
research at least for the remaining part of the career. An obvious 
disadvantage is that scholars in later phases of their careers are 
not subjected to any external monitoring and may no longer 
engage themselves in research. This may well be so but an 
                                                
11 Such behaviour is, of course, inconsistent with the generally held view of referees solely 
acting according to professional standards and ethics. It is, however, difficult to see why the 
economic model of behaviour essentially based on self-interest should not apply to scholars 
in their role as referees.  
12 The academic system in some countries works in this way: full professors in particular are 
not required to show that they continue to publish  (or not). To the extent this is the case, 
the second suggestion has already been realized.  
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academic system should be designed to enable the best rather 
than to prevent the worst13. 
 
(g)  Yet another possibility would be to more openly shape 
several levels of scientific careers. In particular, there should be 
careers at universities and research institutes for which it is 
sufficient to have published in one or several of the hundreds of 
other general and specialized journals, but also in the form of 
books and internet publications, as well as participation in current 
public debates (i.e. acting as a “public intellectual”, see Posner 
2002). Such a policy would serve to produce a broader portfolio 
in the economics profession with respect to type of contribution, 
content, techniques and universities14. With the present focus on 
A-level publications, diversity – a crucial requirement for 
                                                
13 It should be kept in mind that $# system is able to exclude persons who do not perform 
well after having entered it. The relevant question is how large their share is, and how badly 
they affect the system. In the case of academia the damage is not so large because such 
people normally decide to engage more in teaching and in administrative tasks. This helps 
the more productive scholars to have time to do research.   
 
 
14 According to a recent analysis by Oswald (2009) for the United Kingdom outstanding work 
f a set of genuinely world-leading articles f comes from a wide range of sources, namely 21 
different universities not normally considered in the top half-dozen in the country. 
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originality - is indeed threatened as has been empirically shown 
(see Osterloh and Frey 2009a, 2009b).  
To require each and every scholar to aspire to publish in A-journals is 
likely to be a flawed policy and strengthens the oligopolistic power of 
the five A-level journals whose number and composition has 
remained constant over an extended period of time15. As in other such 
factually closed markets the demanders (i.e. the scholars wanting to 
publish in such a journal) may to some extent exploit this situation by 
forcing them to adjust to their preferences and formal requirements. 
Empirical analysis16 suggests that authors from prestigious 
universities have greater success with A-journals because of their 
location and not because they do better research.  
Unfortunately, in several European countries (notably in Germany 
and Switzerland) professors in applied universities (formerly called 
Fachhochschulen) are now required to engage in advanced research 
and to publish at the same level and with the same intensity as their 
colleagues at scientific universities. This expands the prevailing 
emphasis on top-level publications even further.  
                                                
15 Somewhat surprisingly, as more journals become available online, more recent and fewer 
journals and articles are cited. Researchers are more quickly put in touch with prevailing 
opinion tending to accelerate consensus and narrows the range of ideas and findings (Evans 
2008). Alternative procedures to the present publication system are provided by Prhfer and 
ietland 2008 and Tsang and Frey 2006). 
16 The evidence refers to psychology journals, Peters and Ceci 1982. 
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Each of these (and possibly other) options has its advantages and 
disadvantages which must be carefully considered in the context of 
the conditions existing in a particular country at a particular moment 
in time. In countries in which established scholars with only limited 
international importance to play the tune that emphasizes publication 
in A-journals may turn out to be a preferable strategy. In contrast, in 
countries in which an academic career is more open, less emphasis on 
A-journal publication records and a more general evaluation by 
elected seasoned scholars may be more advisable. This paper does not 
propagate any of the options discussed but wants to call attention to 
the major shortcomings of the present system of “publish in A-
journals or perish” to the disregard of other scholarly contributions. 
We certainly need more empirical evidence on many points raised in 
this paper. The major intention is to point out that there are viable 
alternatives to be openly discussed.            
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